Having worked with Baseball Info Solutions, I have become very familiar with the new-age statistics that front offices in Major League Baseball are relying upon.
I will say–for the most part–it has really helped teams grasp the significance that each player has more effectively. Every player that is on a roster was signed for a reason. It’s the job of the organization and, ultimately, the manager to put him in the best position to succeed. The Oakland Athletics and Tampa Bay Rays are the best in terms of getting the most out of every player on the field. They are able to “think outside the box”, something that few managers do now and zero managers did before this statistical revolution.
While I do understand fan’s frustration with teams being a slave to the numbers, it is important to realize that with all the money invested in the game, it would behoove teams to leave no stone unturned and eliminate as much of the guessing game as possible.
I want to discuss what I like and dislike about the concept of statistical analysis and the theories behind sabermetrics.
Pros:
1) Improvements on the traditional statistics.
For more than a century, batters were evaluated based upon the triple crown numbers of batting average, home runs and RBI. Base stealers would bank on their steals and runs scored. Pitchers were evaluated on wins, strikeouts and ERA. Closers would point to their saves.
Teams know that those numbers do not tell the entire story. That’s the whole basis of sabermetrics. Yes, those number do reveal something about the player but it’s not the entire story.
One of the knocks on sabermetrics by the casual fan is that the stats, such as WAR, OPS+ and wRC+, can’t easily be computed. While that is true, there are other stats that are calculated the same way as the everyday stats, and they delve much deeper into a players performance.
If a player suffers a dip in his batting average, home runs and RBI in one year, the consensus is that he regressed as a player. But in the event that you did not watch every game, you wouldn’t know for sure.
What if I told you that player came to the plate with 100 less men on base than the year before, played in a bigger ballpark and the opposing defense converted more of his ground balls into outs? Now you know there wasn’t much he did differently.
Now, let’s run a quick player comparison:
Player A (29 years old): 650 plate appearances, .300 AVG, 20 HR, 100 RBI, 5 SB, 90 R, 20 BB, 150 K, .330 OBP
Player B (24 years old): 650 plate appearances, .270 AVG, 15 HR, 70 RBI, 20 SB, 80 R, 90 BB, 75 K, .360 OBP
Player A will get the MVP votes and probably a huge contract by the Yankees if he’s a free agent. Player B will probably get little attention. But Player B would be a smart investment for two big reasons; projectability and sustainability. He didn’t get lucky, he got on base at a solid clip. He also got “unlucky” when it came to his line drives falling in for hits. Only 60% of his line drives went for hits, when the league average is .690.
Player A struck out a ton, walked very little and still hit .300. That means he’s lucky and it won’t happen next year. He hit .400 when he did not strike out, because the opposing defense was not successful and converting his groundballs into outs. He did hit the ball on a line 25% of the time, but the strikeouts make that unsustainable next year.
People never used OPS to evaluate a player, but it is effective. A player that doesn’t have great power like Brett Gardner can still put up a strong OPS (.800 or higher) if he gets on base close to .400.
2) Better Able to Find Role Players
It used to be cut and dry if the player was capable of starting. If he put up big counting numbers, he was good. However, people ignored the splits. The splits aren’t really advanced stats, it’s just breaking down stats into categories. If a player hits well against lefties and righties, he can be a starter. But, it gets difficult when a player like Lucas Duda that is on his way to producing 30 home runs is not getting it done against lefties. What teams are doing now, is platooning guys that combine to form one good player. Put Eric Campbell in against tough lefties and Duda against righties and you have a player that has an OPS of close to .900.
The Oakland A’s use four platoons. This seems ridiculous and fans scoff at it because it affects “chemistry” but they are putting players in position to succeed. It is overrated to have lineup continuity, it is important to put the best players on the field for each game. Sometimes , your most popular player doesn’t deserve to be in the lineup.
3) Parity
As we saw in Moneyball, when teams try to outbid the Yankees, and value the same players, they get laughed at and left behind. Billy Beane took the players nobody wanted and still won with them. He laughs when the Yankees pay $150 million to a 30-year-old speedster. That guy got paid for his resume, not his future. Always pay for a player’s future ability.
Teams are able to eliminate the advantage in payroll if they get players that can mirror another player’s overall production without doing it in the same way.
Who’s more indispensable for the Brewers; Ryan Braun or Jonathon Lucroy. Based on what Lucroy brings to the defense, it’s him by a wide margin.
It’s a numbers game not a popularity contest. Teams that are successful, like the St. Louis Cardinals, have no problem getting rid of a fan favorite as long as they can allocate that money in different places. Don’t have a superstar taking up 25% of the payroll and be forced to divide 75 million to 24 players.
4) Bullpen Re-evaluation
This one is pretty easy. Don’t limit your best relief pitcher to pitching in the 9th inning of a save situation with nobody on base. Good pitchers get out of jams, if they can’t then they are not capable of being a closer. The title closer is senseless anyway, because often times the toughest situation is not in the ninth inning with a 3-0 lead. For years, Mike Stanton bailed the Yankees out of tough jams. If he was on another team he probably would have been the closer.
Teams are now realizing this. The best pitcher comes in during the highest leverage spot, not just the save situation. Teams are also realizing there’s no point in paying Jonathon Papelbon $15 million a year to close when Ken Giles is better, cheaper and less of a headache.
Cons:
1) Bunting
One of the big factors of sabermetrics is win probability.
Here’s where I turn into a player/fan and leave the stats behind. Sure, you may be more likely to have a big inning by not “giving away an out” and bunting. Sure, the next guy might hit a double to keep the line moving, but what if he doesn’t?
I’ve played enough baseball to know that defense isn’t played in a vacuum. Players make mistakes. Bunting isn’t “giving way an out”, and a good placed bunt can be a hit. At the very least it takes the double play out of order.
Prime example: the infamous Game 7 of the 2006 NLCS. Mets are down two runs in the bottom of the ninth. First and second nobody out. Pitchers spot due up.
Willie Randolph has the option of putting up backup second baseman Anderson Hernandez (or Tom Glavine) to bunt and put the tieing run in scoring position for Jose Reyes, Paul Lo Duca and Carlos Beltran.
Instead he gets seduced by the thought of a walk off home run and puts up injured Cliff Floyd. Of course, it doesn’t work out, Floyd strikes out and we know what ended up happening.
Get ’em on, get ’em over, get ’em in. I don’t care how much of a difference it is in terms of percentages–every game is different, pitchers don’t like runners in scoring position and the double play is out of order.
2) Wins
Yes, a pitcher can only control the outcome until the ball leaves his hand. Yes, some teams don’t score runs. But when I won 30 consecutive games, I found ways to get wins.
There’s something to be said of a pitcher like Clayton Kershaw who knows he might only get two runs to work with, and makes that stand up. A pitcher shouldn’t be expecting to just be a place holder until a reliever bails him out. Finish what you start, it’s why Walter Johnson won 400 games despite playing for the Washington Senators.
When you smell a win, sometimes you just have to bear down and get tough outs. When I was at my best, I was able to do that.
3) Clutchness
Here’s where sabermetics lose me. According to guys like Keith Law and Brian Kenny, clutch does not exist and all situations are important. Tell that to Derek Jeter and Mariano Rivera who made a living on succeeding in the toughest situations against the best competition.
Regardless of the stats, baseball ultimately comes down to a one-on-one matchup and only one team can win. If a player wants it more, they often succeed. You can’t put a value on that, which is why the advanced crowd doesn’t accept it. If you played, however, you know what I’m talking about and it’s what determines the outcomes of games.
Conclusion:
In summation, I do really love the advancements that the sabermetrics has allowed. I just wish some of the theories weren’t so cut and dry.
